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ABSTRACT
Previous studies using micro data to estimate the impact of unions on
productivity in construction in the early 1970's have found productivity to be
higher for union than nonunion contractors in the private sector. The validity
of these studies has been questioned in light of the declining market share of
union contractors. This study re-examines union-nonunion productivity
differences over a sample of retail stores and shopping centers built in the
late 1970's. It finds that square footage put in place per hour is 51 percent
greater for union than nonunion contractors.
Lacking data on wage rates by occupation, the impact of unions on efficiency
can be gauged only by looking at how unions affect costs, profit rates, and
prices. This study finds no mean cost per square foot difference between union
and nonunion contractors and offers mixed econometric evidence on translog cost
functions. There is no difference in profit rates or prices between union and
nonunion contractors in this sample.
Steven C. Allen
Department of Economics
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North Carolina State University
Box 8110
Raleigh, NC 27695
(919) 737-3886Allen (1986a) estimated the impact of unions on productivity over two
samples of construction projects built in the early 1970' s.1 Productivity of
union contractors was at least 30 percent greater than productivity of nonunion
contractors in commercial office building construction, but there was no
difference in the productivity of union and nonunion contractors in school
construction.
There are two puzzles which that study left unanswered: (1) why does the
impact of unionism on productivity vary across different types of construc-
tion and (2) do the results still hold in light of the declining percentage of
construction workers belonging to unions? This paper sheds new light on these
issues by examining the effect of unions on productivity over a sample of
retail stores and shopping centers built in the late 1970's. It also examines
a wider range of measures of economic efficiency, including costs, prices, and
profits in order to establish the robustness of the results.
BACKGROUND
The contrasting results for different types of construction obtained in
Allen (l986a) could be generated by misspecification of the empirical model,
heterogeneity in technology or building codes, or differences in the incentives
of the owners. To test the first possibility, Allen (1987) estimated translog
cost function systems and hedonic price equations and compared mean profit
rates for union and nonunion contractors in the office building and school
samples. In the cost system specification, where input prices rather than
input quantities are exogenous and there are relatively few econometric
restrictions, the results were quite comparable to those obtained with
production functions. Costs were nearly equal for union and nonunion
contractors in the office building sample (actually lower in large buildingsfor union contractors), indicating that the cost of higher wage rates was
offset by greater productivity for union contractors, but costs were higher for
union than nonunion contractors in school construction in all size ranges. The
price results showed no union-nonunion price difference in office building
construction, but higher prices for schools built by union contractors. Profit
rates were the same for union and nonunion contractors within each sample.
The office building and school results are thus clearly robust across
alternative specifications.
This suggests that the differences in union impact between the two samples
arise from differences in either technology or ownership. Allen (l986b)
tested this by examining the impact of unions on productivity over a sample of
public and private non-profit hospitals and nursing homes, all of which were
built under the Hill-Burton program. The productivity of union contractors
was 23 percent greater than that of nonunion contractors in private hospital
construction, but there was no union-nonunion productivity difference in
public hospital construction. Further, productivity of union contractors in
private hospital construction was 33 percent larger than in public hospital
construction. This evidence shows marked differences in union behavior
between public and private non-profit construction, despite identical technol-
ogies and building codes.
There are still two legitimate questions about union impact on private
sector construction which all of these studies leave unanswered. First, the
hypothesis of no union-nonunion productivity difference in private hospital
construction could only be rejected at the 87 percent confidence level. This
means that except for the office building sample, there is no other solid
evidence from micro data of higher union productivity in private construction.
2Because of the small size of the office building sample (83 structures) and the
tremendous diversity in the construction industry, it is natural to question
whether those results can be replicated for another sample of micro data.
Second, it is difficult to reconcile the evidence of higher productivity
of union contractors and equal unit costs, prices, and profit rates for union
and nonunion contractors from the office building sample with the decline in
the percentage of construction workers belonging to unions. Allen (l986c)
shows that this percentage gradually declined from 46 to 41 percent between
1970 and 1977 and then dropped rapidly to 32 percent by 1983. Most of the
work for the projects in the sample studied here was done in 1977, whichmay
give some clues as to whether union contractors still have greater
productivity.
DATA
This paper examines a sample of 42 retail stores and shopping centers
which opened between October 1976 and March 1978. The sample comes from a
survey by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, as part of its Labor and Materials
Requirements program. This was the last survey done under that program. A
random sample of 75 projects was originally selected from a population
stratified by location (four regions) and size (dollar amount). Sample
attrition results from projects turning out to be outside the scope of the
survey (e.g., most space used for offices or residences, renovation instead of
new construction, completion after March 1978) and from lack of contractor
cooperation. BLS does not possess any information about the union status of
the projects excluded from the sample, so no adjustments for attrition bias can
be made.
3The general contractor for each project reported the type of construc-
tion, the total value of the contract, dates of construction, square footage,
and a variety of building characteristics. The general contractor and each
subcontractor reported expenditures on materials and equipment as well as
hours, earnings, and collective bargaining coverage. Out of the 42 projects
used in this study, in 30 cases most labor hours were generated by contractors
covered by a labor-management agreement. These will be referred to as union
projects below; all other projects will be referred to as nonunion. Complete
data on hours and earnings for detailed occupations on each project are not
available, making it impossible to construct a labor quality index. This
is unlikely to bias the results because in my previous studies such indexes
were uncorrelated with productivity and the other coefficients were not
sensitive to exclusion of the index from the model.
Two key variables for the cost function analysis had to be imputed from
other sources. The price of capital equals the rate of return from the 1977
Census of Construction Industries (CCI) for the state in which the project was
located.2 The price of materials is derived from the 1978 Dodge Manual for
Building Construction Pricing and Scheduling. If the Dodge Manual reports a
materials price index for the SMSA in which the project was located, that value
is used as the price of materials. Otherwise the price of materials equals the
statewide employment-weighted mean of the materials price index.3
The relative frequency distributions for all of the building characteristics
used in the results reported here are reported in Table 1. In most respects
the union and nonunion projects are quite similar. The key exceptions to this
general tendency are that union projects are more likely to have two or three
stories, more likely to have masonry exterior walls, less likely to have a
4vinyl floor covering, and less likely to have built-up roofs with steel decking
than nonunion projects. The net effect of these differences in building
characteristics on the results is difficult to predict. Failure to control for
such characteristics would tend to favor union contractors in two cases (number
of stories and type of roof) and favor nonunion contractors in the other two
cases (exterior wall and floor covering).
PRODUCTION FUNCTION RESULTS
As in Allen (1986a,1986b), the production function is assumed to be
Cobb-Douglas. Two dependent variables are examined (value added per hour and
square footage per hour) in specifications which either contain or omit
building characteristics. The building characteristics dummies included in
column 4 of Table 2 were selected according to the same criteria as in the
earlier studies: their coefficients had to be consistent with the engin-
eering data in 1977 Dodge Construction Systems Costs, some of the coefficients
associated with a particular characteristic (e.g. there are three different
dummies for frame) had to be greater than their standard error, and the
characteristic had to be observed in more than one building. The same
characteristics are also used in column 2 to make the value added and square
footage results comparable.
Square footage per hour is 51 percent (exp(.4l4)-l) greater for union than
nonunion contractors in store and shopping center construction in the
specification where building characteristics are included, but only 8 percent
greater when the building characteristics are excluded from the model. The
latter estimate is much smaller than its standard error.
5Which estimate is to be believed? When no building characteristics are
included in the model, the joint null hypothesis for all of the coefficients in
the square feet per hour equation cannot be rejected. Not only is productivity
no different for union and nonunion projects in this specification, but also
productivity is uncorrelated with such conventional variables as capital
intensity, scale, and location. This can result only from extreme measurement
error, inadequate sample size, or failure to include critical omitted
variables. As the results in column 4 indicate, the latter possibility seems
most plausible. Once the building characteristics are added to the model, the
joint null hypothesis is strongly rejected and the conventional significant
correlation between capital intensity and productivity appears. Each of the
summary statistics shows that the building characteristics clearly "belong" in
the equation.
The value added per hour results replicate the findings of earlier studies
by myself and others. With building characteristics excluded, this measure of
productivity is 32 percent greater for union than nonunion contractors; the
productivity advantage of union contractors widens to 48 percent when the
controls for building characteristics are added to the model. Given the
well-known problems in interpreting cross section productivity equations
using value added as an output measure, these results are not by themselves
definitive but they demonstrate the robustness of the square footage per hour
findings.
These results imply that the finding in Allen (1986a) of higher union
productivity in commercial office building construction in 1972-73 cannot be
dismissed because it pertains only to a particular type of construction or to
a time period which is now of no more than historical interest. In spite of
6the small sample size, the results provide further evidence that the behavior
of unions in the construction industry varies dramatically between public and
private sector projects. Still, productivity is but one indicator of the
impact of unions on efficiency and, because detailed information on wages by
occupation in each project is not available in this case, it is quite possible
that despite higher productivity under unionism, total construction costs or
the price of the project might be greater for union contractors because of
higher union wages. To get a complete picture, other indicators of efficiency
must be examined.
COST COMPARISONS
In addition to testing the robustness of the production function results,
cost comparisons also provide the opportunity to replicate the main finding in
Allen (1987) -- thateconomies of scale in union construction allow union
contractors to build larger projects at lower costs than nonunion contrac-
tors. Summary statistics in Table 3 show that the mean value of cost per
square foot is about the same in union and nonunion projects, ignoring differ-
ences in project size. Looking across project size categories, costs per
square foot are lower for union projects of 100,000 square feet or more than
for smaller union projects. Ignoring one nonunion project of 2800square
feet where cost per square foot was almost $54, there is no difference in mean
cost per square foot across different size categories for nonunion projects.
Within each size category, the hypothesis of no union-nonunion cost difference
cannot be rejected.
A more rigorous test of union-nonunion cost differences is to determine
whether the coefficients of translog cost functions and share equations vary
7between union and nonunion contractors. In the single output case, the
function is written
inC +lnY+.5fiyy(lnY)2+YimY lnP
+iinPi +.5EPj lnP lnP (1)
I ii
where Cvariable cost, Y =output,and Pj =priceof variable input i. A
three factor specification is used in the results reported below- -labor(L),
materials (M), and capital (K). Two sets of restrictions from production
theory are imposed in all cases: (1) symmetry, which requires that flij =Pji
and (2) homogeneity of degree one with respect to prices, which requires that
=-;n. 0; Ejj =E8jj
=
EE48jj
=0.
i i i j ii
Shephard's lemma states that aC/aPiX1. In logarithmic terms, this becomes
8lnC/ 8lnP =pX/C Si,
where S is the share of factor i in total cost. If the cost function is (1),
the share equation for each factor is
S = + s8YimY +E1lnP. (2)
To take advantage of the additional information about the parameters appearing
in the share equations, (1) and (2) are jointly estimated below using iterated
seemingly unrelated regressions. One share equation must be omitted to prevent
the variance-covariance matrix of the error terms in (1) and (2) from being
singular. The additional information on factor shares increases degrees of
freedom to 80 in the union sample and 26 in the nonunion sample. Iterated
seemingly unrelated regression produces maximum likelihood estimates which are
invariant to the choice of which share equation is dropped. Six different
8specifications of these systems of equations were estimated: (1) no
restrictions; (2) homotheticity (/3yi=°' all isoquants have the same slope along
a ray from the origin); (3) homotheticity and homogeneity of costs with respect
to output (/3y/3yyO); (4) unitary elasticities of substitution CBij=O); (5)
unitary elasticities of substitution and homotheticity and (6)
unitary elasticities of substitution, homotheticity, and homogeneity
In the union sample none of the six sets of restrictions
could be rejected with a log likelihood ratio test, but sets 3 and 6 could be
rejected for the nonunion sample. This means that meaningful cost comparisons
can be made with specifications 1, 2, 4, and 5. As the last column of Table 4
shows, the hypothesis of equal union and nonunion coefficients can be rejected
only in specification 5. This makes this case the most logical one for cost
comparisons of union and nonunion contractors. The other three contain free
parameters which, although estimated with very little precision, could strongly
influence the cost comparisons.
It turns out that the cost comparisons produce very different results
across these six different specifications. To provide a more complete picture
of the results, cost comparisons from specification 1 are also reported in
Tables 5 and 6.Table 5 reports the translog coefficients and Table 6
summarizes the key results on cost comparisons and economies of scale.4 Union
(nonunion) means of input prices are used to compute the cost and economies of
scale results for union (nonunion) contractors in Table 6. Table 5 also
reports the results of estimating the cost function and share equations
over the pooled sample in a specification where the intercept of the cost
function is allowed to vary by union status. Holding factor prices and output
constant, this model shows that costs are 24 percent greater for nonunion
9contractors. However, the means for factor prices at the bottom of Table 5
show very clearly that the assumption of equal factor prices is untenable.
This assumption is removed in the tabulations in Table 6.
The cost comparisons based on specification 5 replicate the results in
Allen (1987) for office buildings. Costs increase with output much more
rapidly and economies of scale vanish at much smaller output levels for
nonunion contractors. Union contractors produce buildings with more than
180,954 square feet at lower cost than nonunion contractors. The model also
indicates they produce buildings of less than 16,042 square feet at lower cost
than nonunion contractors, but this result is most likely attributable to one
small nonunion project. The hypothesis than lnC -lflCn=0is rejected at
the 95 percent confidence level for projects below 6,081 and above 477,347
square feet (ranges where union contractors have lower costs) and for projects
between 42,319 and 68,597 square feet (a range where nonunion contractors have
lower costs). At most observed output levels, union and nonunion contractors
compete on equal terms.
When the cost comparisons are based on the least restrictive model, the
results for economies of scale are about the same, but nonunion costs tend to
be lower than union costs at almost all output levels. A careful comparison
of the cost functions in Table 6 and the translog coefficients in Table 5 shows
that the main reason for the difference in results is the change in the union
cost function. The nonunion cost function is almost identical in the two
specifications, whereas the intercept and ln Y terms of the union cost function
vary considerably even though the restrictions in specification 5 are not
rejected by the data.
10What are we to make of the conflicting results in Tables 5 and 6? One
view is that the "best" specification shows that the costs of union and
nonunion contractors are nearly equal at most output levels,indicating that
greater productivity offsets the cost of higher wage rates for union
contractors. The other is that the data have delivered a split verdict
and that no firm conclusions can be drawn about cost differences between union
and nonunion contractors.
PRICE AND PROFIT COMPARISONS
Given the evidence on costs, data on the price of projects and contractor
profits must be examined to obtain a complete picture of how unions affect
efficiency in store and shopping center construction. If costs are actually
higher for union contractors, one would also expect them to have either lower
profits, higher prices, or both. If costs are nearly equal onaverage for
union and nonunion contractors, then prices and profits should either beequal
or offsetting.
Price comparisons are based on the union coefficient of hedonic price
functions in Table 7. In a model where the only otherregressors are the
square footage of the project and three region dummies, the price of the
building is 4 percent higher for union than nonunion contractors. As in Allen
(1985), this very simple model explains almost 90 percent of the price
variation across the sample. When controls for building characteristics are
added to the model, the price of each project turns out to be 1.5 percent
lower for union than nonunion contractors. Because neither estimate is
significantly different from zero and both coefficients are quite small in
11absolute value, it seems safe to conclude that there is no price difference
between union and nonunion contractors in the sample.
Profit comparisons are difficult to make because employee benefits and
off-site costs are not reported. To adjust for employee benefits, profit rates
are calculated under two assumptions in Table 8 -- noemployee benefits for
either union or nonunion contractors and no employee benefits for nonunion
contractors only. Employee benefits are imputed for union contractors using
the same technique as in Allen (1987). Under the first assumption, profits
have a 2.6 percentage point greater share of the project price for union
contractors; under the second assumption, a 1.1 percentage point lower share.
In neither case can the hypothesis of no profit share difference be rejected.
This evidence on profits and prices is consistent with costs being nearly
equal for union and nonunion contractors at most ranges of output.
CONCLUSION
This paper has compared productivity for union and nonunion contractors
in retail store and shopping center construction in 1977. The most reliable
estimates indicate that square footage put in place per hour is 51 percent
greater for union than nonunion contractors. Indirect support for this result
is also found in the cost, profit, and price comparisons. Taking higher wages
for union contractors as given, if productivity is really higher for union
than nonunion contractors in the sample, then one would expect to observe no
union-nonunion difference in unit costs, profit rates, and prices. This study
finds no mean cost difference between union and nonunion contractors and offers
mixed econometric evidence on cost functions. There is no difference in profit
rates or prices between union and nonunion contractors in this sample. On
12balance, both the direct evidence on productivity and the indirect inferences
about productivity obtained from studying costs, profits, and prices point to
the same conclusion --despitea moderate decline in market share, the
productivity of union contractors in retail construction in the late 1970's was
much greater than that of nonunion contractors. Whether this is still true
today, after a more rapid decline in market share, is an open question which
cannot be answered with available data.
Viewing these results along with earlier findings based on public (schools,
hospitals) and private (office buildings, hospitals) construction, it seems
quite clear that the behavior of unions and union contractors varies
tremendously with the market environment. In each case where the
union-nonunion comparisons are made over a sample of privately owned
structures, the productivity of union contractors has turned out to be higher
than that of nonunion contractors and the productivity difference has been
large enough to offset the difference in wages, making unit costs comparable.
In each case where the comparisons are made over a sample of publicly owned
structures, there is no union-nonunion productivity difference and the greater
cost of union labor is passed on to the government. The most likely
explanations for this pattern of behavior are that government managers lack
adequate incentives to take steps which would change the behavior of unions and
unionized contractors and that prevailing wage laws prevent the market from
creating those incentives by effectively banning nonunion contractors from
public sector projects in many areas.
13NOTES
i-Other studies examining the effects of unions on productivity are summarized
in Freeman and Medoff (1984). For a critique of these studies see Hirsch and
Addison (1986).
2The price of capital is assumed equal to theaverage rate of return in the
1977 CCI for all construction contractors in the state in which the project is
located. The rate of return equals estimated profits divided by gross book
value of capital at the end of the year. Estimated profits equal 35 percent
of estimated profits and proprietary income. Estimated profits and
proprietary income equal value added less wages and salaries, expenditures
for employee benefits, depreciation, rental payments for capital, and
estimated net interest and indirect business taxes (which is 19.9 percent of
value added less wages, salaries, and benefits). The ratios used to estimate
profits and net interest and indirect business taxes are obtained from the
national income accounts for construction in 1977; details about how these
ratios were constructed are available from the author upon request.
3me price of materials is derived from the 1978 Dodge Manual forBuilding
Construction Pricing and Scheduling in the following manner. If the Dodge
Manual reports a materials price index for the SMSA in which the project is
located, then that value is used. Otherwise, a weighted average of the
indexes for all SMSAs in the state with available data is used. The weights
are 1977 employment in construction, as reported in Employment and Earnings,
May 1978, pp. 124-133.
4Chrjstensen and Greene (1976) define economies of scale (EOS)as
EOS 1 -8lnC/8lnY.
In (1) this gives us
EOS =1-c'y - flyylnY -By lnPj.
1
Union-nonunion differences in EOS are calculated by estimating y, yy, and
Py separately for union and nonunion projects.
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Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1986.Table 1. Relative Frequency Distribution of Selected Building Characteristics,
By Union Status
Union Nonunion Union Nonunion
Stories Interior Wall
One 60 92 Drywall 80 75
Two 33 0 Masonry 10 17
Three 7 8 Other 10 8
Escalators Floor Covering
None 63 92 Wood 3 8
One or More 37 8 Terrazzo 7 0
Vinyl 50 67
Other 20 17
Heat None 20 8
Forced Air 83 75
Radiant Roof Base
(electric) 7 17 Steel Decking 53 92
Other 10 8 Concrete 7 8
Wood or Plywood 40 0
Frame
Steel 37 58 Roof Cover
Concrete 17 0 Shingles 17 0
Masonry 43 33 Built-up 70 92
Wood 3 8 Tile 7 0
Other 7 8
Exterior Wall
Steel 0 17 Foundation
Concrete 13 17 Masonry 10 8
Masonry 67 50 Concrete 83 92
Curtain Wall 3 17 Other 7 0
Other 17 0
Structure
Dept. Store 33 33
Grocery 20 8
Restaurant 7 8
Other Store 7 8
Mall 13 17
Other -
ShoppingCtr 20 25Table 2. Production Function Estimates
Value Added
(1)
Pr
per
oductivity
Hour
(2)
Measure
Square
(3)
FeetperHour
(4)
log (K/L) .245**
(.077)
.311**
(.094)
.229
(.197)
.199*
(.106)
log CL) - .008
(.031)
.027
(.082)
-.054
(.080)
- .101
(.092)
Union .275**
(.087)
.390**
(.137)
.083
(.224)
.414**
(.154)
Building no yes no yes
Characteristics
Included
a .206 .178 .527 .200
R2 .483 .811 .121 .938
F 545** 3.04** .81 10.77**
Mean (S.D.) of
Dependent
Variable
3.000
(.264)
3.000
(.264)
.465
(.519)
.465
(.519)
NOTE: Each equation also includes three region dummies. The additional
building characteristics included in columns (2) and (4) are number of
stories, presence of an escalator, type of frame, type of floor
covering, type of foundation, type of roof base, type of roof covering,
type of heating, whether the building was a grocery and whether the
building was a mall.
*signiflcant at 10% level
**..Significantat 5% levelTable 3. Cost Per Square Foot By Size of Building and Union Status
Number of Observations
Sample Union Nonunion
Cost
Union
Per Square Foot
Union
Nonunion Nonunion
Entire Sample 30 12 20.2 18.2 1.11
(11.5) (11.3)
35,250 sq. ft. 12 2 21.0 34.5 .61
or less (13.9) (27.3)
35,251-99,999 8 6 22.9 14.9 1.54
sq. ft. (14.0) (2.2)
100,000 sq. ft.10 4 17.0 15.2 1.12
or more (3.9) (1.4)
NOTE: Standard deviations are reported in parenthesis. The hypothesis of no
cost difference cannot be rejected in any case.Table 4. Log Lilcelilod Ratio Tests of Cost Functfr*i Restrictions
Equality ofthiai. and
Cost ThmcticiiRestrictions N:xzunicn Coefficients
Tests forTests forTests for
Degreesof Union urdai Pooled Degrees of Restrictias Freedan Saniple Sample Sample Freeckx2l Tests
ttie --- 10 .5
flyj0 2 3.9 1.5 2.9 8 4.6
yir0 3 5.0 219* 13.0* 7 10.6
flj=0 3 5.0 4.9 28.7* 7 11.0
ijyr0 5 9.8 6.2 31.3* 5 j•]•9*
jj..9yj,5yO 6 11.2 27.9* 41.8* 4 18.9k
*Significant at 5% level.Table 5. Transiog Cost System Estimates, Pooled and by Union
Status
Union Nonunion Pooled Union Nonunion
o 7.933 16.756** 14.394** 8.738 l7.569**
(4.648) (1.901) (3.250) (4.476) (1.642) U -.215
y .040 1.587**
(.135)
l.0i2* -.118 l.665**
(.864)
.078
(.347)
.225**
(.608)
.175**
(.837)
.090
(.311)
.232**
L
(.080)
.150
(.032)
.472
(.056)
-.277**
(.078)
.390**
(.029)
.263**
°M
(.181)
.724**
(.292)
.677**
(.126)
i.146**
(.011)
574**
(.011)
.676**
(.180) (.265) (.120) (.011) (.014)
.003 - .048 .009
(.070) (.107) (.008)
-.056 .149 -.012
fiLL
(.073)
.030
(.106)
-.042
(.008)
.206**
p
(.069)
.016
(.095)
.003
(.039)
.150
fi
(.009)
-. 017
(.013)
-.009
(.040)
-. 169'
(.009) (.014) (.037)
Mean Factor Shares:
Labor .389 .263 .353 .389 .263
Materials .575 .675 .603 .575 .675
Capital .036 .062 .044 .036 .062
Means ofIndependentVariables:
in Y 10.844 11.030 10.898 10.844 11.030
in L
in M
in K
2.400
.002
-1.599
1.924
-.045
-1.748
2.264
-.011
-1.642
2.400
.002
-1.599
1.924
-.045
-1.748
N 30 12 42 30 12
*Significant at 10% level
**Significant at 5% levelTable 6. Cost and Economies of Scale By Union Status
Union Nonunion
Range of Output 3850 to 558580 2800 to 487879
Restricted Model
Cost Function at .045(ln Y)2- .1l8(ln Y) .1l6(ln Y)2-1.665(ln Y)
Mean Input Prices +9.617 +17.939
EOS Function At 1.118 -.090(lnY) 2.665 -.232(lnY)
Mean Input Prices
Range of Output Y < 16042; Y > 180954 16042 < Y < 180954
Where Cost is Lower
Range of Output Y < 248202 Y < 97441
Where EOS > 0
Model Without Restrictions
Cost Function At .039(ln Y)2+.O79(ln Y) .1l2(ln Y)2-l.590(ln Y)
Mean Input Prices + 8.244 + 17.528
EOS Function At .921- .O78(ln Y) 2.590- .225(ln Y)
Mean Input Prices
Range of Output Y < 14214; Y > 597793 14214 < Y < 597793
Where Cost is Lower
Range of Output Y < 134281 Y < 99819
Where EOS > 0Table 7. Hedonic Price Equation Estimates
Me an
(S.D) (1) (2)
Union .714 .038 -.015
(.457) (.164) (.104)
log (Y) 10.898 .842** .798**
(1.262) (.061) (.068)
Northeast .167 .121 .287**
(.377) (.228) (.138)
North Central .238 -.054 .137
(.431) (.212) (.137)
West .357 -.196 .238**
(.485) (.203) (.118)
Building no yes
Characteristics
Included
.436 .215
.881 .979
F 53.10** 80.65**
Mean (S.D.) of
Dependent 14.048 14.048
Variable (1.182) (1.182)
NOTE: Building characteristics are number of stories, type of heat, type of
floor covering, type of heating fuel, type of roof covering, type of
exterior wall, presence of an escalator, and whether the building was
a restaurant.
**significant at 5% levelTable 8. Profit and Overhead As A Percentage Of Building
Price By Union Status
Estimate For Employee
No Adjustment For Benefits Subtracted From
Employee Benefits Profits For Union Contractors
Union 28.0 24.3
(6.6) (7.0)
Nonunion 25.4 25.4
(6.0) (6.0)
NOTE: The hypothesis of equal mean profit and overhead rates for union and
nonunion contractors cannot be rejected in either comparison. Standard
deviations are reported in parentheses.